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Abstract
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets
when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First,
we nd that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly
corrects for cost dierences among consumers. Consequently, the outcome is not ecient
even if cost dierences are fully compensated. To achieve rst best, risk adjustment should
overcompensate for serving high-risk agents to take into account the dierence in mark-
ups among the two types. Second, the dierence in switching behavior creates a trade
o between eciency and consumer welfare. Reducing the dierence in risk adjustment
subsidies to high and low types increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from
the elastic low-risk market to the less elastic high-risk market. Finally, mandatory pooling
can increase consumer surplus even further, at the cost of eciency.
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1Abstract in Dutch
We onderzoeken de optimale structuur van een risicovereveningsstelsel in zorgverze-
keringsmarkten waar geen perfecte concurrentie heerst. Wanneer relatief gezonde klanten
gemakkelijker overstappen naar een andere verzekeraar dan minder gezonde klanten, dan
blijft er voor de verzekeraars een prikkel bestaan tot risicoselectie, zelfs wanneer het risi-
covereveningsstelsel verwachte kostenverschillen tussen klantgroepen perfect compenseert.
Om eci entie te bereiken dient de verevening te overcompenseren voor ongezonde klanten,
om zo ook te corrigeren voor verschillen in prijsmarges tussen de klantgroepen. Verder
bestaat er in deze situatie een afruil tussen eci entie en consumentenwelvaart. Een verla-
ging van de mate van risicoverevening verhoogt consumentenwelvaart. De reden is dat zo
de voordelen van fellere concurrentie op de meer elastische markt voor gezondere klanten
overgeheveld worden naar de minder elastische markt voor ongezondere klanten. Tot
slot kan een verbod op tweedegraads prijsdiscriminatie consumentenwelvaart nog verder
verhogen. Dat gaat wel ten koste van een lagere eci entie.
Steekwoorden: zorgverzekering, risicoverevening, imperfecte concurrentie
21. Introduction
Health insurance markets suer from adverse selection. Buyers of health insurance know more
about their expected health care costs than the rms selling insurance. And even if some of
their health characteristics are observable, insurers are often prohibited from exploiting this
information and practising third-degree price discrimination, by so-called community rating
requirements. Insurance companies can however engage in second-degree price discrimination,
oering dierent contracts to high cost and low cost consumers, in order to separate the dierent
types. This separation of consumer types leads to ineciency in health insurance markets (see
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).
An important goal of risk adjustment is to reduce health insurers' incentive to select, thus
enhancing eciency.1 Countries that use risk adjustment include Belgium, Colombia, Germany,
Israel, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. Van de Ven and Ellis (2000), Ellis
(2008) and Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss the dierent ways risk adjustment is used in these
countries. These schemes involve signicant amounts of money. To illustrate, the Netherlands
currently have an elaborate nationwide risk adjustment system with a 2011 budget equal to
18 billion Euro, which amounts to 3% of GDP. This paper analyzes how the money involved
should be allocated to maximize the sponsor's objective function.
Traditionally, risk adjustment focuses on the supply side of health insurance. This literature
tries to predict the health care costs of an individual in a future period of, for example, one year,
based on the observed characteristics of this individual. Variables used include age, gender,
previous diagnoses and drug prescriptions. See Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) for an overview of
variables used in risk adjustment. Making the transfers to insurance companies a function of
these predicted costs tends to increase eciency in the insurance market.2 Glazer and McGuire
(2000), Glazer and McGuire (2002) and Jack (2006) present results along these lines. These and
other papers in the risk adjustment literature have two implications. First, once the prediction
of health care costs for an individual are perfect and the risk adjustment system fully corrects
for any cost dierences (we call this perfect risk adjustment), the insurance companies have no
incentive any more to engage in cream skimming, i.e., to select certain risks. Therefore, once
the cost predictions are good enough, according to this literature the outcome in the health
1See Cutler and Reber (1998) for an estimate of the ineciency in case there is no risk adjustment.
2Depending on the way that risk adjustment is organized, these transfers to insurers are paid by the govern-
ment or another sponsor of the scheme, like an employer.
3insurance market will be ecient. Second, risk adjustment enhances both eciency and equity.
The reason is the following. People with high expected health care costs tend have a low health
status. As risk adjustment pays a higher contribution for such unfortunate high risk people, it
is viewed as contributing to fairness.
We claim that both implications are unlikely to hold in reality. Consequently, risk ad-
justment resources are likely to be wasted if the program is designed on the basis of these
premises. The reason is the importance of the demand side in determining health insurance
market outcomes. It is well known that people do not only dier in their expected health
care costs but also in their tendency to switch insurers. Beaulieu (2002), Buchmueller (2006),
Nuscheler and Knaus (2005), Royalty and Solomon (1999), Schut, Gress and Wasem (2004),
Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein (2002) and Van Vliet (2006) document that old or sick
insured are less likely to switch insurer. For example, in a US study, Strombom, Buchmueller
and Feldstein (2002) nd that young and healthy employees are four times more price-elastic
than the oldest employees. Schut, Gress and Wasem (2004) nd a similar ratio of elasticities in
a comparison between German non-pensioners and pensioners. As both elderly and sick have
relatively higher expected costs than the average person in the population, people with high
expected costs are less likely to switch insurer.3 Importantly, the variables used in these studies
on consumer type and switching behavior are similar to the ones used in risk adjustment. This
connection is overlooked in the traditional literature on risk adjustment.
The main contribution of our paper is to model explicitly this relation between expected
costs and tendency to switch insurer. This leads to the following implications for optimal
risk adjustment. First, even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for expected costs, insurers
still have an incentive to select. The reason is that risk adjustment also needs to compensate
insurers for the foregone mark-ups on the high types. To get an ecient outcome in the
insurance market, risk adjustment needs to overcompensate the high risk types. That is, the
dierence in risk adjustment transfers between the high and low type should be bigger than
their dierence in expected costs (proposition 1 below), and include the dierence in mark-
3This is related to adverse retention as discussed by Cutler, Lincoln and Zeckhauser (2010). Possible expla-
nations for this relation between expected costs and switching behavior include the following. People currently
undergoing treatment tend to be reluctant to switch half-way through. People with a history of sickness and
elderly people have a relation with their current physicians. Moreover, they chose these physicians themselves in
the past. Hence switching to another insurer with another provider network entails high costs for them. These
costs can be both psychological but also entail the transaction costs of transferring medical records. Finally,
there may be a status quo bias that is stronger for people that have actively interacted with their insurer in the
past, for example by ling health care expenditures with their insurer or asking advice about which provider to
go to.
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elasticity) between the two types. Assuming elasticities diering by a factor of four
(see Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein (2002) and Schut, Gress and Wasem (2004)), this
implies that this correction to traditional risk adjustment is of the same order of magnitude as
the mark-up itself. The eect is therefore signicant in less than fully competitive insurance
markets.
Second, the dierence in switching behavior creates a trade o between eciency and con-
sumer welfare. In particular, starting at rst best, introducing ineciency by biasing the
transfers against the high type unambiguously increases average consumer welfare. This is
driven by competition leverage. Increasing the transfer of the low risk type relative to the high
type induces insurers to compete more vigorously for low types. This has three implications.
First, this selection behavior through second-degree price discrimination creates ineciency.
Second, competing more vigorously for low types reduces their insurance premium. Third, via
the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, high-risk types benet from intensied competition
in the low risk market as well. Starting from rst best, the latter two eects dominate the
former and consumer welfare increases. By biasing the risk adjustment transfers against the
high types, competition is leveraged from the low risk market where consumers are likely to
switch insurers, to the high risk market where the tendency to switch insurers is lower. To
illustrate the power of competition leverage, we derive conditions under which maximizing the
utility of the high type implies that the risk adjustment scheme taxes the high risk type and
subsidizes the low type (proposition 2). Although this seems an extreme outcome, it does point
to the possibility that high risk consumers may be better o without than with \conventional"
risk adjustment as the latter may go in the wrong direction.
As a third implication, if people do not dier in their tendency to switch insurer and only
dier in costs, optimal risk adjustment implies that each risk type gets ecient insurance. In
the Rothschild-Stiglitz model this implies a pooling contract. Hence there is no benet to
enforce mandatory pooling in the health insurance market. Indeed, if people dier on other
dimensions, such as taste for risk, enforcing pooling would be inecient. However, in our
model with dierent switching behavior mandatory pooling also has a benet. In particular,
mandatory pooling tightens the IC-constraint relating high to low type utility. As a result, a
given level of competition leverage comes at lower distortion costs. Hence consumer welfare
is higher under mandatory pooling than if rms are allowed to engage in second-degree price
discrimination (proposition 4). In practice, this welfare gain needs to be weighed against
reduced variety in contracts, which may reduce welfare if consumers have dierent tastes for
5risks.
Our paper is related to the health economics literature on health insurance and risk adjust-
ment and the industrial organization (IO) literature on oligopoly with price discrimination. We
discuss each in turn. The risk adjustment literature has two strands. The empirical literature,
as mentioned above, tries to nd the best prediction of an individual's next period health care
costs. It focuses on variables that are easily available, such as age, gender, or zip code, so as
to ensure that the estimated model can be used in practice. Theoretical papers, like Glazer
and McGuire (2000), Glazer and McGuire (2002) and Jack (2006) analyze how imperfect sig-
nals about consumer types should be mapped into risk adjustment transfers. In these papers,
absence of noise implies that perfect risk adjustment leads to ecient market outcomes. Our
paper diers from these papers by explicitly modeling the relation between risk type and elas-
ticity to switch insurers. As a consequence, even with perfectly informative signals, perfect risk
adjustment is inecient.
In the industrial economics literature there are a number of papers on price discrimination
in an oligopoly setting. Examples include Stole (1995), Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and
Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999) (see Stole (2007) for an overview). These papers focus
on the characterization of the equilibrium. A policy question is whether allowing price discrim-
ination raises total welfare. Below we show that, in health insurance markets, banning price
discrimination by mandating a pooling contract can increase consumer welfare. Further, in a
risk adjustment context a much richer set of policy instruments exists besides allowing or ban-
ning price discrimination. Policy makers can adjust the tax or subsidy per consumer type. We
characterize the eects of such taxes and subsidies on eciency (total welfare) and consumer
welfare. Finally, leverage in the I.O. literature refers to rms leveraging market power from one
market to the next. Instruments to do this include exclusionary contracts, vertical integration
and bundling of products, see Rey and Tirole (2007) for an overview. In this paper, in contrast,
we identify a way for the social planner to leverage competition from one market segment to
the next.
Our analysis has two main policy implications. First, risk adjustment should not focus
on the costs, i.e., the supply side, only. Eciency cannot be fully restored in this way. Risk
adjustment should take on board the literature that shows the relation between consumer
type and tendency to switch insurer. We show how predicted costs and switching elasticities
should be combined to nd the risk adjustment transfers that maximize the planner's objective.
Second, policy makers should be clear on their goals. As we demonstrate, if everyone has the
6same tendency to switch insurers, eciency, consumer welfare and the utility of the high risk
type are all maximized by implementing the rst best. Hence, the exact goal of the risk
adjustment scheme is immaterial. However, in the empirically relevant situation the switching
elasticity is negatively correlated with expected health care costs. The goal then does matter
for the exact risk adjustment transfers. Therefore, it is important that the sponsor of the
insurance plan, whether it is a government or an employer, is clear about its objective for risk
adjustment.
The set up of our paper is as follows. We rst introduce the model in section 2 and
discuss conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibria. Section 3 derives optimal risk
adjustment in case the planner's objective is total welfare. We then derive in section 4 how
risk adjustment changes if, instead, the planner wants to maximize consumer welfare. Section
5 shows that mandatory pooling leads to higher consumer welfare than allowing the rms to
price discriminate. As was stressed by Glazer and McGuire (2000), it is important to take
into account that the planner only has imperfect information about consumer types. Section 6
shows that our results are robust to such noisy signals. We conclude with a discussion of policy
implications.
2. The model
We introduce a model in which consumers have dierent expected medical costs and het-
erogeneous preferences over insurers. The former captures the adverse selection problem in
insurance markets. The latter implies that insurers have market power. Recent evidence that
market power is important in health insurance markets includes Dafny (2010). As discussed
in the introduction, we explicitly take into account that people with high expected health care
costs are less likely to switch insurer.
We follow the set up in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Newhouse (1996) to elegantly
capture adverse selection and the ineciency that comes with it. Suppose that there are two
types of consumers, h and l, where the fraction of h types is denoted by  2 h0;1i. A consumer
of type i = l;h has expected medical costs i, with h > l. An insurance contract consists of
a price pi and a coverage qi, implying that an agent has to pay fraction 1   qi of medical costs
herself.
More generally, q can be interpreted as the generosity of the insurance contract. This can
7take the form of copayments and deductibles but also whether the insured is free to choose
the provider she wishes. That is, whether the insurance is fee-for-service, a provider from the
network has to be chosen (as is common in managed care in the form of Health Maintenance
Organizations), or something in between (such as in Preferred Provider Organizations). In each
of these cases, higher reimbursement and more freedom is preferable for each consumer, but
more so for the high risk type who is more likely to need treatment. Glazer and McGuire (2000),
Jack (2001) and Olivella and Vera-Hern andez (2007) chose a slightly dierent set up where
the insurer oers contracts with a dierent mix of treatments for acute and chronic illnesses,
respectively. Types dier in their preferences over the mix of treatments. Mathematically, both
models are similar, although the interpretation diers slightly. Like in our model, in the Glazer
and McGuire (2000) set up the ecient contract is a pooling contract.
To obtain a tractable parametrization, we use mean-variance preferences. The utility for a
consumer of type i who buys an insurance contract with price pi and coverage qi is as follows
u








Here, w denotes the initial wealth of the agent, the variance of a consumer's expected medical
costs equals 2, and r > 0 measures the agent's degree of risk aversion. We only consider
insurance contracts with q 2 [0;1]. Contracts with q > 1 are ruled out as these would invite
serious moral hazard problems: a consumer could then earn money by undergoing treatment.
Similarly, q < 0 is ruled out because consumers would not report any treatment on which they
spent money.
We have two symmetric insurers Ia and Ib who face demand on segment i 2 fh;lg given
by Di(ui
a;ui
b)  0 and Di(ui
b;ui
a)  0, respectively. As demand is written in utility terms we
have Di
1 > 0;Di
2 < 0, where Di
1 denotes the derivative of Ij's demand (j = a;b) with respect
to its own utility oer ui
j on market segment i = l;h. Similarly, Di
2 denotes the derivative with
respect to its opponent oer ui
 j.
Because of moral hazard issues (see e.g. Pauly (1974)), an agent can buy at most one
insurance contract. The individual rationality constraint can be written as
w   p   
i(1   q)   1
2r
2(1   q)




We will assume that this constraint never binds in equilibrium. That is, we focus on the
8case where the relevant outside option for an agent is switching to the competing insurance
company. This is called \full scale competition" (Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999)) or
\pure competition" (Stole (1995)). As illustrated below, in a Hotelling model this is equivalent
to assuming that the whole market is served. Another reason that can justify why we neglect
the individual rationality constraint is that in many countries, health insurance is mandatory.
The main reason for assuming pure competition is that it simplies the budget constraint for
risk adjustment, see equation (7) below.




a) = i where h =  and l = 1   .
Further, Di(u;u) = 1
2i: if both insurers oer the same utility on segment i 2 fl;hg, consumers
split equally between them. With perfect competition on segment i we have Di
1(ui;uu)jui=uu =
+1; Di
2(ui;uu)jui=uu =  1. In words, starting in a symmetric outcome (ui
a = ui
b = ui), a
small increase in ui
a (ui
b) makes sure that Ia gains (loses) the whole market. With less than
perfect competition, say because consumers view insurers as selling dierentiated products, the
derivatives Di
1;Di
2 are nite. In this case, insurers have market power.




















for each uh;ul. This captures the observation that h-type consumers are less likely to switch
insurer than l-types. As mentioned in the introduction, reasons why h-consumers are less likely
to switch insurers include: they may be in the middle of treatment and do not want to switch
insurer (e.g. due to provider network considerations), status quo bias may be stronger if a
consumer interacted with the insurer before and low health consumers are more likely to have
had such interactions in the past. Finally, Di
1(ui;ui) is independent of ui (i 2 fh;lg). Let us
briey discuss an example of the demand structure above.
Example 1 Consider the case where insurer Ia (Ib) is on the far left (right) of the Hotelling
beach of length 1. The travel cost t is the same for both consumer types. Consumers are dis-
tributed over the beach with dierent distributions for dierent types. The symmetric density
function on [0;1] is given by f(x) for a h-type and by g(x) for an l-type, with respective cu-
mulative distribution functions F(x) and G(x). We model the idea that the high types are less
elastic in switching insurer by assuming that F has relatively more mass at the extremes and
less in the middle. For G it is the other way around. Roughly speaking, l types are willing to
buy from any insurer while the high types are \biased" towards the insurer close to them.
9It is routine to verify that for a certain market segment when rm Ia oers utility ua and














both insurers oer the same utility, the market is split fty-fty. If Ia oers higher utility, it
gains market share from Ib and the lower t the faster this goes. Hence, lower t is interpreted











which is implied by the assumptions on the density functions f and g described above. Finally,
in a symmetric equilibrium we have Dh
1(u;u) = f(1
2) independent from the level of u and
similarly for the l-type.
An insurer oering two contracts (one intended for l and one for h)4 needs to take into
account the incentive compatibility constraints for the high and the low type:
ICh : u
h  u




h + (1   q
h) (6)
where  = h   l > 0. It follows from adding the two incentive compatibility constraints
that qh  ql. The constraint for the low type then implies that ph  pl.
Equation (5) shows the idea of competition leverage. If by stimulating competition on the
l-market, the planner can raise ul (by reducing pl) the h-type benets from this as well. Insurers
will reduce ql in response to limit the increase in uh. Competition leverage benets h-types if
the former eect outweighs the latter.
4Note that we consider second degree price discrimination, and assume third degree price discrimination to
be prohibited. In the terminology of the health economics literature, we have community rating. If, say, the
h-type would buy the contract intended for the l-type, he would buy the contract at the same price as the
l-type. In section 5 we consider the case where second degree price discrimination is banned.
102.1. Risk adjustment
We assume that the government wants to use risk adjustment to improve the outcome in the
insurance market. In particular, an insurer receives h (l) for each h (l) customer that it has.
Here we assume that the government can perfectly observe each customer's type.5 In section 6
we show that our results generalize to the case with imperfect observation of types.
To simplify notation, we assume that the overall budget for risk adjustment equals zero.6
That is, the budget equation can be written as

h + (1   )
l = 0 (7)
Using equation (1), we can write the prot margin i (price minus expected cost plus the risk
















Thus, risk adjustment aects market outcomes by changing the margin that health care insurers
make on dierent types of consumers.
2.2. An insurer's optimization problem
As oligopoly models with price discrimination are not straightforward (see Stole (2007) for an
overview), we need to be careful in characterizing equilibrium outcomes. This section derives
sucient conditions for the insurers' optimization problem to be well behaved.
When insurer Ib chooses uh
b;ul
























a 2 [0;1] and the IC constraints for the high-type and the low type (5) and (6),
5This assumption is usually justied by assuming that the government has (ex post) more information than
the insurer ex ante. Hence the insurer is not able to (explicitly) select risks ex ante but the government can
perfectly risk adjust ex post. Alternatively, the insurer has the relevant information but is prevented by law to
act upon this information. To illustrate, in the Netherlands an insurer cannot refuse a customer who wants to
buy a certain insurance contract.
6In particular, below we use dh =  (1   )=dl. In words, we consider changes in risk adjustment for a
given risk adjustment budget. As we do not analyze changes in the budget, we can normalize the budget to
zero without loss of generality.


































Note that Ib's choice of qh
b;ql
b does not aect Ia's prots (for given uh
b;ul
b). Below, we focus on
symmetric Nash equilibria of this optimization problem, dened as follows.
Denition 1 The vector (uh;ul;qh;ql) forms a symmetric Nash equilibrium if (uh;ul;qh;ql)
solves (Puh;ul); that is, Ib chooses uh
b = uh and ul
b = ul.
Directly analyzing this problem is not straightforward for two reasons. First, given Ib's
strategy (uh
b;ul




a). Second, it is routine to verify
that insurer's optimization problem (Puh
b;ul
b) is not concave in its four variables.7 The problem
is, however, considerably simplied if we assume that the incentive compatibility constraint for
the high type is binding and that the incentive compatibility constraint for the low type is non


















b) ( ^ Puh
b;ul
b)
This is an optimization problem with only two variables (for given uh
b;ul
b). Further, as we
illustrate below, it is straightforward to derive sucient conditions such that a stationary point
of ( ^ Puh
b;ul
b) gives the solution to this problem. We rst derive such a stationary point and then
give conditions under which this point forms the solution to the original problem (Puh
b;ul
b).
In our analysis below, we focus on the solution (uh;ul) characterized by the following
7This can be seen as follows. 11 = Dh
11h   2D11, 33 =  Dhr2 and 13 = Dh
1r2(1   qh). Hence the
requirement on the Hessian that 1133 (13)2 > 0 cannot be satised for values uh so low that Dh  0. Note
that {strictly speaking{ the Hessian does not need to be negative semi-denite. Because prots are maximized







































These equations give us the stationary point of ( ^ Puh
b;ul
b) for the case where uh
b = uh;ul
b = ul.
As discussed above, we are not interested in parameter values which lead to ql = 2 [0;1].
Sucient conditions for problem ( ^ Puh
b;ul
b) to be concave are straightforward to derive.8 We












































































To illustrate, we show that if demand is linear (Di
11 = 0) sucient conditions for concavity
imply a restriction on the relative slopes Dh
1=Dl


















































For prots to be concave in uh
a;ul
a, the determinant of the Hessian must be positive for all
values uh
a;ul
a that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. A sucient condition for this
8In fact, quasi-concavity of  is already sucient for a stationary point being the global maximum of .
Olivella and Vera-Hern andez (2007) give an example of a Hotelling model where the symmetric equilibrium is




Below we focus on equations (10){(13) as solution to problem ( ^ Puh
b;ul
b). The following lemma
gives sucient conditions under which such a solution is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. In order







In words, ~ ui maximizes prots when the insurer focuses on the i market (where its opponent
oers ui as determined by equations (10) and (11)) and ignores the other market.






h   ~ u
l)  0:
Then (uh;ul;1;ql) solves (Puh;ul) and hence is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The assumption makes sure that focusing on the l-market leads to non-negative prots
on the h market. As shown in the proof, this excludes the possibility that a corner solution
dominates an interior stationary point in terms of prots.9
2.3. Total welfare
Throughout this paper, we will consider both total and consumer welfare. Papers that consider
an insurance market with zero prots, for example due to perfect competition, cannot make
this distinction. In that case, by necessity, consumer welfare equals total welfare. However, in
our case the insurers have market power and the dierence between consumer and total welfare
is important. As shown below, optimal risk adjustment depends on whether the planner wants
to maximize total welfare (eciency) or consumer surplus.
In symmetric equilibrium, total welfare is dened as











The rst term on the right hand side corresponds to total utility of the high type plus the prot
of the insurers on those types. The second term corresponds to total prot on, and utility of,
9See Olivella and Vera-Hern andez (2007) for a numerical analysis of the case with corner solutions.
14the low type. Note that we focus on symmetric equilibria. Hence the (dis)utility a consumer
experiences when buying one brand rather than the other, the travel costs in our Hotelling
example, does not change in the comparative static exercises that we do below. Therefore we
ignore this term in the denition of welfare.
3. Total welfare
We rst consider a market where the insurers can use second degree price discrimination by
oering two contracts: one contract for the h-type and one for the l-type. Section 5 considers
the case where each insurer is forced by the government to oer only one contract (mandatory
pooling).
We write problem ( ^ Puh
b;ul













































with a similar expression for insurer Ib.  denotes the shadow price of the incentive compatibility
constraint. Following lemma 1, we characterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium with the rst
order conditions, which can be written as
q
































l) =  (23)






2(1   )r2 (24)
where we use that Dl(u;u) = 1
2(1   ). Hence, the lower  (i.e., the less tightly the incentive
compatibility constraint binds), the higher the coverage for the low type.
15Using the rst order conditions in equations (20){(23), total welfare can be written as
W = w   





This expression shows that total welfare increases as  decreases. This result obtains because
total welfare is only aected by eciency. Prices are a pure transfer between consumers and
insurers. As  decreases, ql increases and hence eciency as well as total welfare rise.
As mentioned in the introduction, the existing risk adjustment literature focuses on equal-
izing costs. At rst sight, this seems equivalent to equalizing price cost margins. As the h-type
is less elastic in switching insurer than the l-type, the mark up is higher for the h-type. Naively,
one might expect that the higher mark up reduces the compensation to be paid for higher cost
consumers to make insurers indierent. Ecient risk adjustment would then undershoot the
cost dierence: h l < h l. However, the next result shows that this intuition is incorrect.
Proposition 1 There exist h;l that implement rst best as an equilibrium outcome where
both types buy the same contract with ecient insurance (ql;h = 1). It has h > l, that is,
risk adjustment in the standard direction, and h  l > h  l, that is, risk adjustment has to
overshoot the dierence in expected costs between types.
The intuition behind this result is the following. It follows from the IC-constraints (5) and
(6) that we can only get eciency (ql = 1) when the utilities uh;ul are equalized. Which risk
adjustment h   l causes insurers to oer both types the same utility? To achieve uh = ul
we need to compensate insurers both for the higher expected cost h   l and for the missed




1(ul;ul) > 0 for the h-type.10 If insurers are forced to oer both
types the same utility, they face the opportunity cost of the higher mark up on the h-type. If
this opportunity cost is overlooked (such that h   l = h   l) insurers have an incentive to
separate the types by extracting rents from the inelastic h-type and competing more vigorously
for the elastic l-type, leading to ql < 1.
In other words, the current risk adjustment models with their exclusive focus on the
cost/supply side will not restore eciency in health insurance markets. Even if one would
perfectly compensate for cost dierences between types, ignoring their diering demand elas-
ticities leads to selection behavior by insurers and hence inecient health insurance.
10Note that this expression equals the dierence in price over elasticity for each type.
16If risk adjustment corrects for both the dierence in costs and the dierence in mark up,
and consequently overshoots the standard risk adjustment (h   l > h   l), we nd  = 0.
We call this rst best or ecient risk adjustment. Ecient risk adjustment implies that the
insurer can optimize the contracts of each type separately without worrying about IC and the
resulting contracts will satisfy IC. Optimizing each contract separately induces the insurer to
give each type ecient insurance.
Note that in the equilibrium in proposition 1, insurance companies oer pooling contracts.
Hence making pooling mandatory will not aect the outcome in this case. However, as shown
in section 5, this does not imply that mandatory pooling is an irrelevant instrument for the
planner.
4. Consumer welfare
The analysis above on eciency and rst best is the standard analysis of risk adjustment
in papers like Glazer and McGuire (2002) and Jack (2006). However, as mentioned in the
introduction, it is not obvious that this is the appropriate analysis in a context with imperfect
competition. Competition authorities and regulators around the world explicitly claim that
their objective is consumer welfare, not total welfare. Further, in the health care sector, policy
motivations for interventions such as risk adjustment usually focus on consumers and solidarity
between dierent types of consumers, rather than on eciency.11
In order to analyze the consequences for risk adjustment of such a consumer focus, we
introduce the following objective function for the social planner:
CS! = !u
h + (1   !)u
l (25)
with ! 2 [;1]. With ! = , the planner maximizes consumer surplus. With ! >  the planner
gives relatively more weight to the (unfortunate) h-type than to the (lucky) l-type. This is a
simple way to formalize solidarity with the h-type.12
11Relatedly, in his overview paper Ellis (2008) mentions \the concept of `optimal risk adjustment' in which
the sponsor's goal is to maximize consumer welfare rather than to just break even."
12The underlying assumption is that the h-type was born with, say a chronic disease like diabetes. Hence
h's high expected health care costs are exogenously given. Then fairness or solidarity considerations can lead
the planner to give a higher weight (! > ) to the h-type in the objective function. Alternatively, high health
care costs can be endogenous due to, for example, smoking behavior, food habits, drug use etc. See Van de Ven
17Let us rst consider consumer utilities as a function of the shadow price  of the incentive





















2r2(1   )2: (27)
where we use the shorthand notation Di
1 = Di
1(u;u) (i 2 fl;hg) when this does not cause
confusion. The social planner can adjust h;l, subject to the budget constraint (7), to optimize
consumer welfare CS!. But note that a change in risk adjustment also aects the shadow
price of incentive compatibility, . In particular, an increase in l (at the cost of reducing h)
makes it more attractive for insurers to compete for the l-type. This increases ul and hence
tightens incentive compatibility for the high type. As a consequence,  increases. We identify
competition leverage with this increase in  as it shows the extent to which the planner uses IC
constraint (5) to increase uh. The increase in l and the increase in  have opposite eects on
the utilities, as is clear from equations (26) and (27). Depending on the relative strength of the
direct eect (reduced h) and the indirect eect (increased ), the high types might actually
win if subsidies towards them are reduced from their rst-best values.
The idea of competition leverage is to use the binding IC constraint (5) to let the h-type
benet from the more intense competition in the l-market. To nd the eect of  on uh we add

















  (1   )(u
l   u
h) + constant (28)
where the constant does not depend on  and
u
l   u





using equations (5) and (24). Note that the constant in equation (28) equals uh in case  = 0.
Equation (28) shows that an increase in  aects uh through three channels that we label
margin eect (ME), distortion eect (DE) and inequality eect (IE). We discuss each of these
and Ellis (2000) for a discussion of the limits to solidarity due to such moral hazard eects.
18in detail.












This eect is the driving force of competition leverage. As the l-market is more competitive
than the h-market, heating up competition between insurers in the l-market by increasing l
leads to higher ul. By the IC constraint this increases uh and  as well. Clearly, if both markets
would be equally competitive, then ME = 0.






2r2 > 0 (30)
The total distortion in the market equals the fraction (1   ) of the population aected times










The distortion eect equals the derivative of this expression with respect to . Note that
although qh = 1, equation (28) shows that the distortion does reduce uh. This eect is driven
by IC constraint (5) linking the utilities of the two types. Through this constraint the distortion
reduces uh as well. Clearly, with  = 0 there is no distortion and by the envelope theorem a
small increase in  has no rst-order eect. However, this does not imply that the utilities of
the two types remain equal after an increase in . This brings us to the last eect.
Starting from  = 0, an increase in  creates or increases a wedge between uh and ul.
Once ql < 1, l-types can always mimic h-types and they are still better o as their expected






This observation that l-types are always weakly better o than h-types no matter which con-
tracts are oered is the motivation for solidarity. The unfortunate h-type is worse o than the
l-type and it is not possible to make the h-type strictly better o than the l-type. Increasing
 increases the wedge between the utilities: d(uh   ul)=d = IE > 0.
19We can do a similar analysis for the eect of  on ul. The following proposition summarizes
these decompositions of the eect of competition leverage on utilities. Moreover, to illustrate
the strength of competition leverage, we derive a condition under which uh is maximized by
having h < 0.
Proposition 2 We can decompose the eect of  on the agents' utilities and CS! as follows
duh
d
= ME   (DE + (1   )IE) (33)
dul
d
= ME   (DE   IE) (34)
dCS!
d
= ME   (DE + (!   )IE) (35)
If ! = , optimization of CS leads to  > 0 and ql < 1.
If ME > (1 )IE, then an increase in  away from its rst-best value (leveraging competition)
increases CS! for each ! 2 [;1]. In fact, both types win from such an increase in .
For IE close enough to zero, we nd that uh is maximized by setting h < 0.
First of all, in the absence of a margin eect (ME = 0), as the existing risk adjustment
literature assumes, the proposition implies that ecient risk adjustment ( = 0) maximizes
both uh and CS! for each ! 2 [;1]. In this sense, the existing literature is correct in focusing
on rst best because eciency and solidarity go hand in hand. However, as discussed in the
introduction it is well documented that h-types are less likely to switch insurer compared to
l-types. This dierence in switching behavior implies that ME > 0 and therefore that eciency
and consumer welfare start to diverge.
Starting from rst best (where  = 0 and hence DE = 0) an increase in  increases
CS. Competition leverage raises consumer surplus while reducing eciency. Hence, from
an (average) consumer perspective, eciency (ql = 1) is, in fact, not optimal. If, moreover,
ME > (1   )IE, we see that duh=dj=0 > 0. Since the low type's utility ul always increases
with  at  = 0, in that case dCS!
d j=0 > 0 for each ! 2 [;1]. Roughly speaking, if the
margin eect exceeds the inequality eect, even the h-types benet from competition leverage.
Increasing l (and hence reducing h) leads to higher uh and hence to higher CS!.
The intuition is that higher l intensies competition on the l-market. In order to pocket
the higher l for more low-type consumers, insurers raise ul. Via intra-brand competition (IC)
20this forces them to raise uh as well. This eect is partly undone by increasing the distortion
(reducing ql) but under the assumption that IE is suciently small compared to the dierence
in mark ups, the intra-brand eect outweighs the inequality eect, such that uh increases with
l.
For IE close enough to zero, the h maximizing uh is negative. The intuition for the
condition that IE should be small is the following. At rst best,  = 0, we have h > 0 (see
proposition 1) hence  needs to fairly high for h to turn negative. When maximizing uh, 





, the cost of increasing  is small if IE is small. This leads to such a high 
that h actually turns negative in maximizing uh.
Note that the last result implies that for IE close to zero, all consumers are better o without
risk adjustment than with ecient risk adjustment. Indeed, the ecient risk adjustment goes in
the wrong direction. Although this result may be extreme, it does point to the following more
general policy implication. Even though from an eciency point of view, risk adjustment is
desirable, a planner that invokes consumer solidarity may want to abstain from risk adjustment
if consumers are suciently risk averse (high r2) or the dierence between types () is small.
We are not aware of empirical studies trying to quantify IE so that it can be compared to the
dierence in elasticities found in papers like Royalty and Solomon (1999) and Schut, Gress and
Wasem (2004). Nevertheless,  seems more likely to be small for an employer oering health
insurance to its employees than for a whole country combining risk adjustment with mandatory
insurance.
5. Mandatory pooling
As shown in proposition 1, ecient risk adjustment implies that insurers oer both types the
same contract. This might suggest that there is no role for mandatory pooling, as long as
risk adjustment is chosen optimally. In this section, we show that this intuition is incorrect.
Mandating pooling leads to higher CS! than allowing for second-degree price discrimination
(separating contracts). Moreover, the consumer welfare maximizing insurance contract features
inecient insurance (q < 1).
In this section, we assume that each insurer is allowed to oer only a single contract with
some price p and a co-payment 1   q. Hence, the insurer cannot price discriminate between
21types. The margin i on type i = l;h therefore equals

i = p   q
i + 
i:
Given a price and a co-payment, the utility of the h-type satises
p = w   u





and equation (5) holding with equality determines the utility that the l-type receives given the
utility of the h-type. However, the latter is not an IC constraint here, as there is only one
contract, but an \accounting identity", which relates the utilities of the h-type and the l-type
consumer. Put dierently, this equation ensures that ph = pl = p when qh = ql = q.


































a + (1   q))
The optimization problem is similar to equation (19), with the additional requirement that
































l)    = 0 (39)
Writing again Di
1 = Di

























13Note that if equations (20){(23) solve (Puh;ul), then (37){(39) solve (Puh;ul) with the additional constraint
that qh
a = ql
a = qa. Intuitively, by limiting possible deviations for insurers (by requiring qh = ql) it becomes
easier to move from local conditions to a global optimum.
22Note the dierence with equation (26), where the last term in the utility of the h-type consumers
is missing because they receive full insurance (qh = 1).
It is obvious that with mandatory pooling, the regulator could again choose risk adjustment
as given by (51) in the appendix, i.e., to optimize eciency. Clearly, then  = 0 and consumers
are fully insured, q = 1 (equation (37)). However, as shown below, if the objective is to
maximize weighted consumer surplus CS!, mandatory pooling leads to lower h, lower q and
higher  than their respective rst best values.















2r2   (1   )(u
l   u
h) + constant (42)
where the constant14 does not depend on  and
u
l   u




Although DE and IE could be dened dierently in the pooling case, we choose to use the
denitions in equations (30) and (32) to facilitate the comparison of the two cases in proposition
4 below.
Proposition 3 We can decompose the eect of  on the agents' utilities and CS! as follows
duh
d
= ME   (1   )(DE + (1   )IE) (43)
dul
d
= ME   (1   )(DE   IE) (44)
dCS!
d
= ME   (1   )(DE + (!   )IE) (45)
If ! = , optimization of CS leads to less than perfect risk adjustment: q < 1.
If ME > (1 )2IE, optimization of consumer surplus CS! (for any ! 2 [;1]) with mandatory
pooling leads to less than perfect risk adjustment: q < 1.
Hence, we nd again that ecient risk adjustment is not in the interest of consumers. At
 = 0, CS is increasing in : competition leverage raises consumer surplus. In fact, comparing
14The constant equals uh in case  = 0. Moreover, in case  = 0 proposition 1 leads to the same outcome as
with mandatory pooling. Hence, the constant in equation (42) has the same value as the one in (28).
23the expressions for duh=d and dCS!=d in the proposition above with the expressions in
proposition 2 shows that the benets of increasing  (ME) are the same in both cases, but
the costs (DE and IE) are a factor 1    < 1 smaller in the pooling case. This shows that
competition leverage is less costly in the pooling case and can be used to a bigger extent (higher
). Indeed, the following result shows that under mandatory pooling CS! cannot be lower than
when allowing for second degree price discrimination and is strictly higher if q < 1.












for each ! 2 [;1].
If ! = 1 then ME < (1   )2IE < (1   )IE implies that ecient insurance ( = 0) is
optimal in both proposition 2 and proposition 3. Even if separation is allowed, the outcome is
pooling and hence utilities and welfare are the same in both cases.
However, if either ! =  or ME > (1 )2IE then competition leverage is used to a bigger
extent under pooling because the costs of doing so are smaller than in the case where price
discrimination is allowed. Hence consumers are better o under mandatory pooling than under
separation.
The intuition for this is as follows. As the planner increases l, insurers compete more ercely
for l-types thereby reducing pl and increasing ul. The IC constraint (5) then implies that either
uh increases as the planner intended, or coverage q falls because this is the insurers' instrument
to keep uh low. When second degree price discrimination is allowed, reducing coverage ql is
relatively cheap for insurers. Indeed, ql only aects prots on the l-market. However, with
mandatory pooling, reducing q aects prots on the both the l- and h-market segment. This
makes it expensive for insurers to use q as a \defense mechanism" against competition leverage.
Hence rms reduce q less (compared to ql) in response to competition leverage . Since the
reduction in q is the planner's cost of competition leverage, the cost terms (DE and IE) are
smaller in proposition 3 compared to proposition 2. Due to the lower cost, if competition
leverage is used under mandatory pooling, it leads to higher consumer welfare than second
degree price discrimination.
Finally, by solving dCS!=d = 0 for the optimal q in both the case where separation (qsep)
24is allowed and with mandatory pooling (qpool) leads to the following result.
Corollary 1 If ! =  then (1   ql)sep = (1   q)pool. If ! >  and qpool < 1 then (1   ql)sep <
(1   q)pool.
In words, in the case where ! = , we know from proposition 4 that mandatory pooling
leads to higher consumer surplus than allowing for second degree price discrimination because
more competition leverage (higher ) is used under mandatory pooling. Since both  and the
eciency loss at given q grow with the same factor when switching from separation to pooling,
for utility function (1) CS is optimized at the same 1   q under both separation and pooling.
Under separation, this distortion only applies to the l-type while with mandatory pooling this
distortion applies to everyone. If ! >  and some distortion is introduced under mandatory
pooling (to rule out the case where qpool = qsep = 1), then the distortion with mandatory pooling
is actually higher. In both cases, the (1   q)pool distortion leads to lower costs of competition
leverage and hence CSpool
! > CSsep
! .
6. Imperfect observation of risk
Above, we assume that the planner can ex post perfectly observe each customer's type. In
reality, the planner may only have a noisy signal of a customer's . The question is: are the
results above robust to the imperfect observation of risk?
Following Glazer and McGuire (2000), let us assume that the planner cannot perfectly
observe the consumers' types. Rather, the planner observes an imperfect signal (H;L) of
consumers' types (h;l). With probability P h, the h-type will give a high signal H, and with
probability 1   P h the high type's signal will be L. Likewise, with probability P l the l-type's






Thus the h-type will more likely produce the H-signal, and the l-type will more likely produce
signal L.
The planner can now base the risk adjustment only on the observed signal (H;L). Con-
sumers, however, know their types and base their choices on their actual types (h;l). Call the
25risk adjustment based on the signal H;L. Then an insurer will get an eective subsidy on the




H + (1   P
h)
L;




H + (1   P
l)
L:
Note that the ~ 's interpolate between the 's.
To analyze the optimal H;L in this case, note that our analysis when signals are perfect
fully carries through with  replaced by ~ . Consequently, the optimal subsidies that we found
in that case are the optimal eective subsidies ~ . The subsidies the planner should give based
on the signals (H;L) should therefore be an exaggeration of the optimal subsidies, with positive
subsidies being increased and negative ones being decreased. This observation is independent























To illustrate, when it is optimal to subsidize the low types (~ l > 0) at the expense of the high
types (proposition 2), imperfect observation of types only makes this stronger in the sense that
H < ~ h < 0 < ~ l < L. We conclude that our results are, indeed, robust to the introduction
of noisy signals about consumers' types.
7. Conclusion
In several countries, imperfect competition in markets for health care insurance goes hand in
hand with risk adjustment. The resources allocated to risk adjustment are signicant; e.g.
approximately 3% of GDP in the Netherlands. Conventional risk adjustment focuses on the
supply side and tries to correct as well as possible for cost dierences between high-cost and
low-cost consumers. Existing theoretical papers argue that this improves eciency by reducing
26insurers' selection incentives, while at the same time guaranteeing access to health insurance
for high-risk consumers by lowering insurance premiums.
We study the consequences of the demand side for optimal risk adjustment. In particular,
we take into account that consumers' price elasticities are negatively correlated with their
expected health care costs. We nd that the dierence in switching behavior creates a trade o
between eciency and consumer welfare. From an eciency point of view, to nullify selection
incentives, risk adjustment needs to overcompensate the high risk types (relative to their costs)
to get an ecient outcome in the insurance market. From the point of view of consumer welfare,
reducing the level of risk adjustment as compared to the rst best increases consumer welfare
by leveraging competition from the elastic low-risk market to the less elastic high-risk market.
Mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus even further, at the cost of eciency.
What are the policy implications of our ndings? First, an exclusive focus on increasing the
accuracy of cost forecasts in rening risk adjustment systems is misguided. Risk adjustment
resources will be partially wasted by this focus on costs. Risk adjustment systems should take
into account the impact they have on insurer competition, and the possibility of leveraging
competition that arises because of the relation between consumer type and tendency to switch
insurers. Our model shows how the literature studying this relation can be taken on board.
Accounting for the demand side of health insurance may be easier than it seems, because the
empirical literature studying consumers' brand sensitivity uses many of the same explanatory
variables as the literature on risk adjustment. Our analysis also shows that nullifying selection
incentives using risk adjustment does not benet consumers. Thus, risk selection by insurers
should not be viewed as bad per se, as seems the case in policy debates.
Second, policy makers should be clear on their goals. When setting risk adjustment levels,
policy makers should decide whether their goal is to optimize total welfare or consumer welfare.
Although conventional risk adjustment most likely promotes eciency, it will reduce consumer
surplus under the { in our view { realistic assumptions that competition in health-insurance
markets is imperfect and healthy consumers are more price elastic than high-risk consumers.
If the aim of policy makers is to reduce high-risk consumers' costs in a market with adverse
selection, risk adjustment should 'undershoot' relative to the rst best. In extreme cases, risk
adjustment may even run in the opposite direction. That is, high risk types are better o if
they are taxed to nance a subsidy for the low risk types.
On a more general level, our analysis points out the possibility of leveraging competition
27from one market to the other. In imperfectly competitive markets with second degree price
discrimination, we show that policy intervention in the form of taxes and subsidies may in-
crease competition by capitalising on incentive compatibility constraints. In markets for health
insurance, a framework for such a policy, i.e. the risk adjustment system, already exists and
can be used to this eect. One may wonder whether the idea could be used in other markets,
too. As an example, Dessein (2003) considers competition between telecom networks in mar-
kets with dierent types of consumers, those with high and low demand for calls. When price
elasticities dier among those types, Dessein nds that interconnection fees (the fees which
networks charge each other to put through calls to their consumers) may be used to inuence
the level of competition in a way that is related to the mechanism we describe in this paper.
Regulators wanting to inuence network competition can take this mechanism into account
when regulating interconnection fees.
28References
Armstrong, J., F. Paolucci, H. McLeod and W. Van de Ven. 2010. \Risk equalisation in
voluntary health insurance markets: a three country comparison." Health Policy 98:39{
49.
Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers. 2001. \Competitive price discrimination." RAND Journal of
Economics 32(4):579{605.
Beaulieu, Nancy Dean. 2002. \Quality information and consumer health plan choices." Journal
of Health Economics 21(1):43{63.
Buchmueller, Thomas. 2006. \Price and the health plan choices of retirees." Journal of Health
Economics 25(1):81{101.
Cutler, D., B. Lincoln and R. Zeckhauser. 2010. \Selection stories: understanding movement
across health plans." Journal of Health Economics 29(5):821{838. Harvard Kennedy
School.
Cutler, D. and S. Reber. 1998. \Paying for health insurance: the tradeo between competition
and adverse selection." Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(2):433{466.
Dafny, L. 2010. \Are health insurance markets competitive?" American Economic Review
100(4):1399{1431.
Dessein, Wouter. 2003. \Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing." RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 34:593{611.
Ellis, Randall P. 2008. Risk adjustment in health care markets: concepts and applications,
in Lu, Mingshan, and Jonnson, Egon, Eds, Paying for Health Care: New Ideas for a
Changing Society. Wiley-VCH publishers Weinheim , Germany.
Glazer, Jacob and Thomas G. McGuire. 2000. \Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with
Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care." The American Economic Review
90(4):1055{1071.
Glazer, Jacob and Thomas G. McGuire. 2002. \Setting health plan premiums to ensure ecient
quality in health care: minimum variance optimal risk adjustment." Journal of Public
Economics 84(2):153{173.
29Jack, William. 2001. \Controlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are
endogenous." Journal of Public Economics 80(1):25{48.
Jack, William. 2006. \Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition."
Journal of Health Economics 25(5):908{926.
Newhouse, J. 1996. \Reimbursing health plans and health providers: selection versus eciency
in production." Journal of Economic Literature 34(3):1236{1263.
Nuscheler, Robert and Thomas Knaus. 2005. \Health Care Financing Risk selection in the
German public health insurance system." Health Economics 14 (12):1253{1271.
Olivella, Pau and Marcos Vera-Hern andez. 2007. \Competition among dierentiated health
plans under adverse selection." Journal of Health Economics 26(2):233{250.
Pauly, M. 1974. \Overprovision and public provision of insurance." The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 88:541{562.
Rey, P. and J. Tirole. 2007. A primer on foreclosure, in Armstrong, M. and Porter, R., Ed.,
Handbook of industrial organization. North Holland pp. 2145{2220.
Rothschild, Michael and Joseph Stiglitz. 1976. \Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Mar-
kets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information." The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 90(4):629{649.
Royalty, Anne Beeson and Neil Solomon. 1999. \Health Plan Choice: Price Elasticities in a
Managed Competition Setting." The Journal of Human Resources 34(1):1{41.
Schmidt-Mohr, U. and M. Villas-Boas. 1999. \Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information: Dif-
ferentiation in Credit Markets." RAND Journal of Economics 30:375{396.
Schut, Frederik T., Stefan Gress and Juergen Wasem. 2004. \Consumer Price Sensitivity and
Social Health Insurer Choice in Germany and the Netherlands." International Journal
of Health Care Finance and Economics 3:117{138.
Stole, L. 1995. \Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly." Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 4:529{562.
Stole, L. 2007. Price discrimination and competition in Armstrong, M. and Porter, R., Ed.,
Handbook of industrial organization. North Holland pp. 2221{2299.
Strombom, Bruce A., Thomas C. Buchmueller and Paul J. Feldstein. 2002. \Switching costs,
price sensitivity and health plan choice." Journal of Health Economics 21(1):89{116.
30Van de Ven, W.P.M.M. and R.P. Ellis. 2000. Risk adjustment in competitive health care
markets, in Culyer, A.P. and Newhouse, J. P., Ed., Handbook of health economics. North
Holland pp. 754{845.
Van Vliet, R. 2006. \Free choice of health plans combined with risk-adjusted capitation pay-
ments: are switchers and new enrolees good risks?" Health Economics 15:763{774.
31A. Appendix





























l) > ^ (u
h;u
l) (50)
We consider three cases:
(I) Dh(uh;uh) > 0 and Dl(ul;ul) > 0:
 without loss of generality qh = 1
{ Suppose not, that is qh < 1, then increasing qh increases prots (@=@qh > 0)
and relaxes (ICl)
 without loss of generality ql = 1   ul uh
 ; suppose not:
{ if ql > 1   ul uh
 , (ICh) is violated
{ if ql < 1   ul uh
 , (ICl) is slack and increasing ql raises prots
but then inequality (50) contradicts that (uh;ul) solves ^ Puh;ul.

















where  ui = maxfujDi(u;ui)  0g. This contradicts equation (50).
(III) Dh(uh;uh) = 0 and Dl(ul;ul) > 0: we have the following inequalities:
^ (u
h;u








where the second inequality follows from the assumption that Dh(~ ul;uh)(w   h + h  
~ ul)  0. Again we nd a contradiction of equation (50). Q.E.D.
32Proof of proposition 1 Assume that there is a choice of h;l that gives an ecient solution:
qh;l = 1. Note that from the rst order condition (23) it follows that ql = 1 implies that  = 0.
The incentive compatibility constraints for the high and the low type read
ICh : u
h  u




h + (1   q
h):
Therefore, eciency implies uh = ul. Since also  = 0 in an ecient equilibrium, we have from
the rst order conditions
u















where we write Di
1 = Di
















Conversely, setting the values for  such that this holds evidently solves the rst order conditions
plus the IC-constraints. Note that there are multiple combinations of h and l that yield the
rst-best outcome. The budget constraint h + (1   )l = 0 pins down a unique pair l;h.




1 (by assumption (3)), the rst-best implementing h and l satises
h > l and h   h > l   l. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2 Both in this proof and the proof of proposition 3, we use a slightly
dierent way to compute the eect of  on uh;ul and CS! than the one given in the main text.
The reason is that, for reference below, we need the relation between h;l and .
To obtain an expression relating  and h;l, subtract the rst-order conditions for the util-
ities, (22) and (21) and then use the one for the low type's coverage ql (24) and the binding


































1(ui;ui). It is now convenient to look at the total derivative of the shadow
price , taking l as function of , and substituting h =  1 
 l. From the implicit function







































































Consequently, at rst best ( = 0), low types always gain from increasing  (i.e. the direct
transfers l outweigh the drag from the incentive compatibility constraint). More remarkably,
under the assumption that ME > (1 )IE, also high types gain from transferring premiums
to low types, starting from the rst best.





















which is then also positive at  = 0 under the assumption that ME > (1   )IE. We proceed
to nd the optimum value (!). Solving dCS!=d = 0 for  gives us

(!) =  1














It follows that d=d! < 0. Hence, as long as ME > (1 )IE, we have that (!) > 0 for all
!.
By denition, uh is maximized for  = (1). We proceed to show that h can be negative
for this value of . Since h =  1 
































This is negative, of course: risk adjustment in the \standard" direction. We now show that at
the point where uh is maximized ( = (1)) l is a positive number (and then h is negative,

























































Combining this and using equation (58) in the second and third step we nd:
l((1))















































































It follows from equation (55) that (1) is increasing in r2 and that (1) ! +1 as r2 ! +1
and/or  ! 0. Hence we nd that l((1)) > 0 for IE > 0 small enough. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3 We start by nding the relation between risk adjustment h;l and






















































































































2(!   ) (65)
Hence, for equally-weighted consumer surplus, ! = , equation (3) translates into positive
(). It is obvious that (!) falls as ! increases. ME > (1 )2IE implies that  > 0 even
if ! = 1. That is, even when trying to maximize the utility of the h-type, the planner still
distorts q < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4 At  = 0, comparing equation (60) and (51) shows that under
both separation and pooling we have











Hence h (and l) are the same for  = 0 under separation and pooling. This implies that
CSpool
! (0) = CSsep















(2 + !   ) > 0
for each !  ; > 0. Since under pooling (!) > 0 if either ! =  or for each ! 2 [;1] if
ME > (1   )2IE, the result follows. Q.E.D.
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